EJFCT1MENT OF PASSENG I;RS,

tioner for a writ of habeas cofpus,
any State from being impleaded
in a Federal Court by any person
whatever. It should'be interpreted
in favor of the immunity, and to
defeat every decree which should
betray or impair it. Devices which
do not assail directly, but which
furtively avoid the thing forbidden
in form, but do the thing substantially and in effect, are contrary to
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the true purpose and meaning of
the Amendment.
An injunction against a State's
officers destroys an essential function of State autonomy-the power
to sue her debtor in her own Court
and by her own officers, even though
such suit should be a violation of a
contract with her citizens in spirit
and in terms.
ALEXANDER DURBIN LAUER.
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Ejection of Passenger-Defective Ticket-ContributoryNegligence.
The plaintiff asked at the city ticket office of the defendant for a
ticket from Detroit to Ouebec and return. By an error of the agent he
was sold a ticket iii two coupons, both reading from Detroit to Quebec
alike. On inquiring the meaning of this at the station, he was told by
an agent, who stated he was unauthorized, that he thou'ght conductors
would understand the mistake. The plaintiff made no further inquiries,
and after three weeks on his return journey, one conductor accepted the
coupon reading the wrong way, but later in the journey the plaintiff was
ejected by a second conductor, who refused to accept the irregular coupon.
Held: (I) The face of a ticket is conclusive evidence to the conductor
of the terms of the contract of carriage between the passenger and the
company.
(2) The plaintiff was bound to know the law, and either by due
diligence could have avoided the damages growing out of the negligence
of the defendant, or was bound to use due diligence to reduce damages
resulting from the defendant's breach of contract; and that this omission
was negligence as a matter of law, not requiring to be submitted to' the
jury. BROWN, J., dissenting.
(3) That a breach of rules in the plaintiff's favor by one conductor
did not affect the plaintiff's legal position.
,52 Fed. Rep., No. 2, p. 197.

IASSENGERS' REMEDY FOR
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

In Errorto the Circuit Court of the United States for
the EasternDistrictof iJfichigan.

Action on the case by John B. Poulin against the
Canadian Pacific Railway Company to recover damages for
ejection from a train.- The declaration was demurred to
on the ground that it should have sounded in contract.
Demurrer overruled. Jury instructed to find for defendant.
Plaintiff brings error. Affirmed.
PASSENGERS' R-EMEDY FOR BEING EJECTED FROM TRAIN, BECAUSE,
OWING TO FAULT OF TICKET AGENT, HE HAS
INOT PROPER TICKET.
The circumstances' of this case
*involve a number of parties-three
that invariably occur when this
species of controversy arises between a plaintiff passenger and a
defendant railroad company, and
two additional pafties, whose presence tends to confuse, but not -to
alter, the position of the other three.
The important persons are two
agents of the same principal, one
of whom makes a mistake, the
second of whom enforces the rules
of his principal, while the third
person is the plaintiff who, owing
to the original mistake of the first
pgefit, falls a victim to the rules
enforced by the second.
When the plaintiff asked for a
round-trip ticket between Detroit
and.Quebec he was not given what
he paid for, and a breach df con-'
tract then occurred. When he was
ejected from the train returning
from Quebec it was because he did
not have what he had asked and
paid for, but something that on its
face gave him no right to be on
-that train. For this ejection he
brought an action on the case
against the company whose agent
had ejected him. The Court 'directed a verdict for the defendant,

on which the judgment was affirmed, but for a reason altogether
independent of whatever rights are
created by the above stated facts,
and forming no part of the special
law of Common Carriers or of
Agency. This was the plaintiff's
contributory negligence in not taking steps to avoid the inconvenience
xifade imminent by the carelessness
of the defendant's agent
This question must be considered
before the others involved. For
though the case rests upon it,.it is
not the main question; but, as will
later be seen, supposing the plaintiff had not been considered guilty
of contributory negligence, his
right under the circumstances to
ride with a wrong ticket remains
to be examined.
Both the outgoing and returning coupon were
printed "Detroit to Quebec," instead of the latter's reading the reverse way, as is customary in excursion tickets. .This the plaintiff
noticed at the station. The man
who re-assured him was by his own
account not in a position to declare
tickets valid or invalid. The plaintiff reached Quebec duly, and remained there for three weeks, during which he made no inquiry
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about his return coupon. An inquiry at the company's office would
have corrected the error and averted
the inconvenience. On the return
trip one conductor accepted the
plaintiff's explanation and allowed
him to travel; but a subsequent
conductor refused to take a ticket
which read the wrong way, and demanded payment of fare. The
plaintiff could not pay, and was
ejected.
The man who reassured the plaintiff when he started, and the conductor who accepted his explanation on the return trip, made no
change in the plaintiff's position.
Neither of them had authority to
alter the import of tickets, and
furthermore the plaintiff suffered
nothing by their acts. They, therefore, drop out of the case. The
plaintiff was misinformed by a man
who told him at the time he had
nothing to do with it, and that the
regular agent was not there. As
the plaintiff had three weeks to
inquire and neglected to do so, the
Court considered he had omitted a
legal duty, namely, to shield the
defendant from the consequences
of his breach of contract, and was
hence precluded from recovery by
this contributory negligence. One
Judge dissented on the ground that
it should have been left to the jury
whether the plaintiff's duty under
the circumstances was a reasonable
one or not.
If the question was, "Did the
plaintiffdo what ordinarily prudent
passengers do under similar circumstances?" the question of fact as
to what ordinarily prudent passengers do was one of a sort on which
the jury frequently have a right to
pass.
If the plaintiff was bound to
know the law that a ticket is not

FROM TRAIN.
good in a direction opposite to that
in which it reads, then there was
nothing to submit to the jury. Or
again, if there was the duty to
shield the defendant from the consequences of his mistake, which
the law imposes in a wide range of
cases, then it seems there may
have been still for thejurythe question whether the circumstances imposed this duty on the particular
plaintiff.
But on the whole, the view taken
by the majority of the Court seems
in accordance with the accepted
rule that "when the duty is defined
a failure to perform it is of course
negligence, and may be so declared
by the Court:" STORY,J., in MCCully v. Clarke and Thaw, 40 Pa.
Stat., p. 4o6. There was no doubt
the plaintiff could read. There
was no doubt his suspicions about
the ticket had been raised, for he
asked about it. It would then seem
that it was in the province of the
Court to declare he was negligent
in taking no further steps. For
though in one sense there was no
formulated standard of prudence
(such as looking out for approaching trains at a crossing), still there
could not be much difference of
opinion .s to what a man should
do who knew he held a ticket which
read the wrong way, and had three
weeks to inquire whether he could
use it so or not.
The next question in the case
was raised by the demurrer to the
plaintiff's action, overruled in the
Court below. The Circuit Court
expresses no opinion whether the
action should have been in the
nature of tort or of contract, deciding independently on the ground
of contributory negligence.
There are numerous cases in
which tort arises out of a breach
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of contract, and the plaintiff has
his election as to which form of
action he will use.
In Brown v. Boorman, ii Clark
& F., r, where the status of agency
was created in the defendant by a
contract made between him and
the plaintiff to sell and deliver oil,
one of the terms being not to deliver without payment. This the
defendant violated. The declaration was in case. The Court said:
"I
apprehend, therefore, that
whether this count be in contract
or in tort is quite immaterial; it is
a count on the case, setting out the
circumstances and facts of which
the plaintiff complains; he shows
a cause of action by showing a contract, a duty, and a breach; and if
so, it is a good dount in an action
on the case, and he is entitled to
his judgment." More specifically,
and to the same effect, is Burnett v.
Lynch, 5 Barn & C., p. 6o9. And
in general, where a contract has
established certain special duties
between its parties, obligations to
perform certain acts, a damage resulting from failure to perform
them is more nearly allied to tort,
and the plaintiff's election will be
determined by the nature of the
case, the remedy, the number of
parties, etc.: I Chit P1., 135, 397There- are many cases in which
recovery in .assumpsit would not
meet adequately the damage sustained, but where the plaintiff by
bringing case may claim compensation for a larger class of injuries resulting from the same act of the
defendant.
In R. R. Co. v. Constable, 39 Md.,
x5o, it is held that where the law
imposes upon a party an obligation
which he neglects to perform,
whereby damage results to another,
the party injured may bring an
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action on the case founded in tort.
The duty arose out of a contract to
keep fences in repair, the neglect
of which resulted in damage to
crops.
In Green v. Clarke, 12 N. Y., 343,
the action of tort was sustained for
loss of goods where the plaintiff
could not have sued in contract, as
the contract had not been made by
himself personally. In election
between contract and tort the plaintiff himself must suffer the damage,
or there can be no action for negligence. Harter v. Morris,i8 Ohio St.,
492; Illinois, etc., Ry. v. Benton,
69111., 174; Smith v. Leavenworth,
15 Kansas, 8I; Scott z. Nat. Bank
of Chester Valley, 72 Penn. St.,
471.
In cases where the circumstances
more closely resemble ,the present
one, decisions seem to vary.
In MacKay v. Railroad Co., ii
S. R. Rep., 737, the plaintiff had
purchased what was regarded as a
round trip ticket between Ravenswood and Wheeling, but it proved
like the two coupons in the present
case-each end read the same way.
The defendant refused to pay his
fare, was ejected, and brought trespass on the case. The Court say:
"There is no act of trespass shown
by this evidence. . . . The evidence does show a breach of the
company's contract to convey the
plaintiff. ....
He can not maintain an action for ejection . . .
but must look to the breach of contract."
In Bradshaw v. South Boston
Railroad Co., 135 Mass., 407, the
same view is taken by the Court:
"It follows that the plaintiff was
where he had no right to be after
his refusal to pay his fare, and that
he might properly be ejected from
the car." The plaintiff was there-

BEING EJECTED FROM TRAIN.
fore not allowed to maintain his
action of tort.
In Murdock v. Boston & Albany
Railroad Co., 137 Mass., 293, the
plaintiff brought tort for being
expelled from a train of the defendant's. The plaintiff was sold
a ticket that the conductor properly refused to accept.
The
mistake was the agent's, on whose
assurances the plaintiff took his
ticket.
Here the plaintiff was
allowed to maintain his action of
tort. It is difficult to follow the distinction made by the court, that in
the case of Bradshaw v. Railroad
Co. the agent had neglected to give
the plaintiff any ticket, and that
here the agent had given him a
wrong ticket. But if the distinction
is valid, the two preceding cases
are consistent.
In Hufford v. Grand Rapids &
Indiana Ry. Co. 53 Mich., i8,
the Court is doubtful, but seems
inclined to hold that an action
of tort would lie: "The plaintiff
. . should have paid his fare
and looked afterward to the railroad "company for the refunding
of the money. . . But we are
all of opinion that if the plaintiff's
ticket was apparently good, he had
a right to refuse to leave the car."
And see Townsend v. Ry. Co., 56
N. Y., 295; Railroad Co. v. Griffin,
68 II-, 499; McClure v. Railroad
Co., 34 Md., 532; Shelton v. R. R.
Co., 29 Ohio St., 214; Downs v.
R. R. Co., 36 Conn., 287; Petrie v.
R. R. Co 42 N.J. Law, 449. Some
of these, however, would only impliedly seem to favor the view that
the plaintiff has his election, and
this doctrine is not necessarilyinvolved in their decisions.
In the present case the Circuit
Court avoids deciding the question.
On the overruling of the demurrer

to the form of action by the Court
below, it is said: "Upon the correctness of the conclusion ther&
reached we do not express an
opinion."
It is to be understood that this
apparent uncertainty (See 47 Fed.
Rep., p. 86o-86r) obtains only in
the particular line of cases here
presented. Where goods have been
damaged during transportation the
plaintiff may declare either in case
or assumpsit.
The next point is that where a
ticket reads one way between two
towns, does this give its holder the
right to travel the opposite way
between those same towns?
In Pennsylvania Company v.

Bray,

125

Indiana,

229,

the passen-

ger presented the wrong end of a
return ticket, explaining when his
attention was called to it that this
was the end given back to him by
the conductor on the outgoing trip,
who had made a mistake in retaining the incoming coupon.
The
Court was asked to instruct that:
"If a passenger gets on a railroad
train and presents for passage a
ticket which on its face shows that
it is not good for passage on that
train, he is bound to pay his fare
and look afterward to the company to refund the money and
make him compensation for his
trouble; but if he refuses to pay his
fare, and is expelled from the train,
he cannot recoverdamages." This
instruction was refused. On appeal
the Court held it was no error to
refuse the instruction.
Where a passenger presented a
ticket good from M to H, intending to ride from H to M, this ticket
was admitted to be invalid: Pease
v. Ry. Co., 101 N. Y., p. 369.
So in Keeley v. Boston & Maine
R. R. Co., 67 Me., 163, a passen-
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ger going from Boston to Portland
presented a ticket reading from
Portland to Boston. A conductor
had told him it was good. The
Court said: "Does a ticket one
way give the right to pass the other
way instead? We find no case deciding that it does. . . . Such is
not the contract which the ticket
is evidence of. . . . The conductor
merely expressed an opinion about
a matterwith which he atthe time
had no business.
The plaintiff
had ample opportunity to purchase
another ticket, and should have
done so." This was an action on
the case and the plaintiff was nonsuited.
From the three preceding cases
it would seem that a single ticket
reading the opposite way from that
in which a passenger is going is
valueless, while the wrong part of a
return ticketmay be explained into
validity: See also Godfrey v. Ry.
Co., 116 Ind., 3o; Ry. Co. v. Fix,
89 Ind., 381.
These Indiana cases raise the
further question: "What evidence
is the face of a ticket as between
the passenger and conductor?" As
between the passenger and the railroad company the law seems tolerably well settled: that if by carelessness a wrong ticket ig sold,
there is a breach of contract. In
other words, the ticket is not conclusive evidence of the cofitract:
Quivly v. Vanderbilt, i7 N. Y.,
306; Rawson 'v. Railroad Co., 48
N. Y., 212; Van Buskirk v. Roberts,
31 N. Y., 661; Henderson v. Stevenson, L. R., 2 H. L. Sc., 470; Railroad Co. v'. Harris, 12 Wall., 65;
-Peterson v. Railroad Co., 8o Iowa,
97; Georgia R. Co. v. Olds, 77 Ga.,
673; Bradshaw v. 'Railroad Co.,
supra;Murdock v.Railroad Co., 137
Mass., 293. This does not seem to

be disputed. But as between conductor and passenger opposite
views are found. Sometimes the
ticket is held to be condusive evidence of the passenger's rights.
Hufford v. Grand Rapids and
Indiana Ry. Co., 53 Mich., m8, the
plaintiff asked for a ticket from
Marton to Traverse City. Its appearance caused him to question
the agent if it was good, and the
agent informed him that it was. It
was not; and to avoid being put off
the car the plaintiff paid the fare to
the conductor, bringing case for
being wrongfully threatened with
expulsion. The Court adopted the
rule of an earlier case (Frederick
v. Marquette, etc., R. R. Co., 37
Mich., 342) that "the ticket must
be the conclusive evidence of the
extent of the passenger's right to
travel. No other rule can protect
the conductor in the performance
of his duties, or enable him to
determine what he may or may not
lawfully do in managing the train
and collecting the fares."
This seems unqualified; and a
number of cases fall into line with
it: Townsend v. R. R. Co., 56 N.
Y., 295; Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. v.
Griffin, 68 Ill., 499; McClure v.
Philadelphia, etc., R. R. Co., 34
Md., 532; Shelton v. Lake Shore,
etc., R. R. Co., 29 Ohio St., 214;
Downs v. N. Y., etc., R. R. Co., 36
Conn., 287; Petrie v. Pennsylvania
R. R. Co., 42 N. J. Law, 449; Yorton v'. Milwaukee R. R. Co., 54
Wis., 234. In some of these cases
the passenger changes from one
train to another, and has been prematurely deprived of his ticket by
a conductor's mistake, or has been
given in exchange for it a paper of
a lower grade than the original
ticket, not giving a right to ride on
first-class trains; or has not been
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handed a stop.over check when
justly entitled to it, and thus has
no ticket to show, but only his
word that he had one and was
deprived of it. In all of them the
same rule is applied-a passenger
must have a ticket and the right
one, or he must pay his fare; and
no explanation can be received in
lieu of a ticket. The mistake of
an agent in depriving a passenger
of the evidence of his right to ride
in a train gives the passenger a
remedy against the company for
breach of contract, but no right to
insist on riding in the train.
Pennsylvania Co. v. Bray, 125
Ind., 229. Here, it may be remembered, the mistake of one conductor
was in returning the wrongcoupon
of an excursion ticket The passenger, on refusal to pay his fare, was
ejected by the other conductor.
The Court below was asked to instruct that "the ticket presented
by the passenger is conclusive as
to whether or not he is entitled to
passage on said train." The Court
refused so to instruct, and was sustained on appeal following Lake
Brie, etc., Ry. Co. v. Fix.
This case seems to lay down the
contrary rule that a passenger need
not have the proper ticket, and an
explanation may be received in lieu
of it. The mistake of an agent
does not destroy the passenger's
right to ride on a train.
There remains to ascertain from
these cases what has been said
about the position of the second
agent-the conductor who ejects
the passenger, and of the passenger's position who is ejected. It
has been said already that these
cases involve three necessary parties: agent A, who makes the
original mistake; agent B, who
ejects or threatens to eject the

passenger; and the passenger who
falls between them. It is agent B
and the passenger that are now to
be considered.
Townsend v. R. R. Co., 56 N.Y.,
295.
Passenger prematurely deprived of his ticket through mistake
of agent A. Agent B, on his resisting, puts him off. Trespass brought
by plaintiff. The Court (pp. 3oo302): "I am unable to see how the
wrongful act of the previous conductor can at all justify the passenger in violating the lawful regulations upon another train. For the
wrongful act in taking his ticket he
has a complete remedy against the
company. . . . The question
is . .
. whether resistance
• was lawful on the part of
the plaintiff. If so, the singular
case is presented where the regulation of the company was lawful,
where the conductor owed a duty
to the company to execute it, and
at the same time the plaintiff had
the right to repel force by force and
use all that was necessary to retain
his seat in the car. . . . No
one has a right to resort to force to
compel the performance of a contract made with him by another.
• . .This rule will prevent breaches
of the peace instead of producing
them."
Yorton v. Milwaukee, Lake Shore
& Western Ry. Co., 6 Am. and
English Ry. Cases, 322. Passenger
asked for a stop-over ticket, and by
mistake of agent A received a check
good only on the train he was stopping off from. Agent B forcibly
ejected him front a subsequent
train.
The Court (pp. 324-327): "Was
the plaintiff entitled to ride on a
subsequent train, not having a
proper stop-over check, or was the
second conductor justified under
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the circumstances in putting him
off the train when he refused to pay
his fare? . . . Now it is practically conceded that the defendant
company had such a rule or regulation for the guide of its conductors.
It seems to us there was no
other course for him to pursue
under the rules of the company,
for he was certainly not bound to
take the plaintiff's word that he
had paid his fare and that (agent A)
had made a mistake in not giving
him a stop-over check.
That conductor, therefore, had the
lawful right to eject him. . . .
He was not entitled to a passage on
that train."
Toledo, Wabash & Western Ry.
Co. v. McDonough, 53 Ind., 289.
Passenger's first-class ticket was
taken by agent A, who gave him
in exchange a card which agent B
refused to receive, and ejected him.
The Court, p. 293: "The jury may.
have found that the conductor
(agent A) . . . assured the plaintiff
• . . that the card would assure
him transportation .... If he did
so assure him, we do not see why
the company is not liable for the
act of the other conductor (agent
B) in putting him off."
It is not easy to reconcile this
with the two preceding cases.
Lake Erie & Western Ry. Co. v.
Passeng6r's
Fix., 88 Ind., 382.
round trip ticket was taken by
agent A, who by mistake returned
him the wrong half. Agent B.
ejected him. The Court, p. 384:
"One who acts in good faith ought
not to be deprived of his rights
through the fault of the servant of
the carrier who has undertaken to
carry him safely." So here the
action to recover damages for ejection was held rightly laid.
In Pennsylvania Co. v. Bray
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(supra) the Court is asked to instruct that "if such ticket shows
on its face that the passenger is not
entitled to passage on said train,
the conductor may lawfully eject
him therefrom unless he pays his
fare." This instruction was refused.
These cases are sufficient to show
that the rights of agent B and the
passengers in the matter of ejection
are viewed differently in different
courts. Nor can it be said thatany
real distinction is stated, or can be
found, between the return coupon
cases and others.
In Hufford v. Grand Rapids &
Ind. Ry. Co., 53 Mich., 11S, the
Court does not seem willing to announce either rule squarely. It is
said (pp. 120-121) that the passenger "had better submit to the temporary inconvenience" of paying
his fare, "and it would have been
very prudent and proper for him
to adopt this course, . . . but we
are all of opinion that if the plaintiff's ticket was apparently good, he
had a right to refuse to leave the
car."
On the other hand, there is a case
which adopts the view that, under
a by-law prohibiting a person from
traveling without first paying his
fare and obtaining a ticket, the
company are justified in removing
from the train a person without a
ticket, though he offers to pay his
fare. The plaintiff knew of the
by-law, but this hardly seems to
distinguish this case from those
preceding: McCarthy v. Dublin, etc.
Ry. Co., I. R., 5 C. L., 244.
From an examination of the foregoing cases, it seems difficult to
extract any theory that will reconcile them, except that they were
decided rather according to the
amount of undeserved hardship of
each individual plaintiff than on

BEING EJECTED FROM TRAIRN.
settled principles of law. In fact,
may it not be that the question of
contributory negligence, though
seldom specifically at issue, is the
latent reason for many of the decisions? This would certainly
furnish a reasonable distinction
between such cases as Keeley v.
Boston & Maine R. R. Co., where
the passenger had plenty of opportunity to get a proper ticket, and
Toledo, Wabash & Western Ry. Co.
v. McDonough, 53 Ind., 289, where
the passenger on one train was
given in exchange a ticket not good
on a second train into which he
was peremptorily ordered to get.
Here he had no chance to avert the
ejection which followed.
The chief confusion, perhaps, in
these cases is the manner of regarding the tort, or the passenger's right
to bring tort. Theprqsence of agent
B seems to shunt much of the
reasoning off to a side track. Not
infrequently the Court will say:
The mistake was made by agent
A; that was a breach of contract for
which the passenger has his remedy. But agent B acted in strict
accordance witli his duty in ejecting a passenger who had no adequate evidence of his right to ride
on the train. Therefore B committed no wrong, and how can
there be a tort ?
The fallacy of this lies in not
looking at the original contract
from the breach of which the injury resulted, and from which the
right of action springs. If there
has been any wrong at all, how can
agent B's proper conduct correct it
when this conduct merely. carries
on the wrong done? The fact that
the ejected passenger could not

bring trespass against this agent B
for the act of ejecting him has
nothing to do with the passenger's
right against the company whose
mistake placed him in a position to
be ejected. The doctrine of election between contract and tort is
simply, that when a breach of contract leads to a damage, the sufferer
may sue on his damage if he finds
it to his advantage to do so. Therefore, that logic which from the
premise that agent B committed no
wrong deduces the conclusion that
the passenger suffered no wrong,
would pretty nearly abolish the
doctrine of election. But it is easy
to see that the premise concerning
agent B leads merely to the conclusion that, as between him and
the passenger, there is no assault,
and leaves untouched'the real issue
between the passenger and the railway company.
The conclusions to be drawn from
all these cases are hard to state;
but it would seem that the best
authorities are in favor of the following propositions:
(i) A passenger properly ejected
for lack of proper ticket may recover in tort or contract.
(2) As between the passenger and
the railroad, the face of a ticket is
not conclusive evidence of his
rights.
(3) As between the passenger and
the conductor, the face of a ticket
is conclusive evidence of his rights.
(4) Contributory negligence on
the passenger's part may intervene
and apparently reverse any one of
the three preceding propositions,
though this factor seldom appears
in the language of the courts."
OWEN WISTER.

